Chernobyl and USSR

The 26th of April 1986 saw the occurrence of the unexpected nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Soviet Ukraine. Due to an explosion at reactor four within the powerplant the world experienced vast amounts of radioactive material being deposited into the environment, with radionuclides being released all through the Northern Hemisphere and people experiencing fatal health consequences.^[1] The event occurred at a time where Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was attempting to reform the Soviet Union through policies such as glasnost and perestroika. Glasnost focused on creating more openness within the governmental system where information would be better communicated with the public, while perestroika focused on restructuring the Soviet Union’s economy and political system.^[2] The nuclear disaster exposed the contradictory nature of the government who went against their newly implemented policies as soon as the catastrophe occurred. The selfish ambitions of the government and the structure of a risk society soon became evident. The Chernobyl disaster and the implications of it challenged the fulfilment of these policies by exposing weaknesses within the Soviet Union and provides a way to understand why Gorbachev was accurate in stating that Chernobyl was ‘perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union’.^[3]

The Chernobyl disaster challenged the enforcement of the glasnost policy by exposing the fact the government had once again withheld information from the public. The Soviet Union had a long history of silence on serious matters including natural and human-led disasters, and this was not limited to domestic news but also international. Gorbachev believed secrecy and a lack of communication was causing weakness within the Soviet Union and therefore glasnost, a policy of openness, was necessary if the Soviet reign was to continue. Despite this new direction of openness that Gorbachev attempted to take, when faced with Chernobyl the government cowered and kept silent. Where the right thing to do was admit fault and save the people, the Soviets hid crucial information and continued with May Day parades despite the high risks of radiation.^[4] On May 14th, 1986, Gorbachev addressed Chernobyl for the first time on Soviet television; he described the reports of international news as ‘malicious lies’ and a ‘highly immoral campaign’ due to their exposure of the scope of the disaster, rather than holding the government accountable for the damage.^[5] Official statements were only released two days after the detection of radiation in Sweden while many Soviet citizens began relying on information received from international contacts who heard a different explanation of Chernobyl through Western news compared to what inhabitants were hearing from the government. Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury argue that glasnost represented a 'sophisticated public relations approach rather than a more truthful reporting of the news', suggesting the policy attempted to please the people but Chernobyl exposed the falsehood of it.^[6] The lack of information and clarity about the disaster and the long-term health effects it would impose led to widespread uncertainty and distrust amongst the public. There could be no hope within the policy of glasnost after the mishandling of the information about the disaster; if the government could not even be open about life-threatening consequences that were a result of their misconduct, how were the people expected to trust the government with other matters? The Soviets had only felt compelled to report the consequences once the information was revealed by neighbouring countries and media; perhaps if this did not occur silence could have continued to characterise the aftermath of the disaster. Chernobyl shattered the foundation upon which glasnost could succeed, and therefore contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union by preventing the reform that was expected to save it.

     Perestroika attempted to reform the economic environment of Soviet Communism but again this was challenged by the disaster as Chernobyl had damaged the economic situation of the Soviet Union. Perestroika attempted to democratise the economic organisations and slowly move away from socialist economic policies, however, such intense reforms would only prove to be unsuccessful when the Soviet Union was already burdened by the economic consequences of Chernobyl.^[7] Finances went towards compensation, health care and relocations while unemployment was also rising, and agricultural occupations were in decline because of the loss of one fifth of Belarus' agricultural land.^[8] Recent studies have suggested that the cost of all the governmental efforts for Chernobyl would have amounted to $230 billion.^[9] Economist Peter J. Boettke argues that the Soviet economy was ‘structurally weak since its founding’ and therefore Chernobyl would only intensify the issues experienced by the state.^[10] Within an already damaged economic system the financial consequences of the disaster would have destroyed hope for the reformation of the economy. Establishing new methods of business and moving towards a new system would have proved almost impossible when the burdens of Chernobyl weighed heavy on the backs of the Soviet Union. Large elements of  Soviet budgets would have been sacrificed to recover from the aftermath of the disaster, and with a loss of finances new economic ideas had a weak foundation on which they could survive. While Chernobyl did not destroy opportunities for perestroika single-handedly, it derailed the fulfilment of it as the disaster became a financial priority to be dealt with.

Chernobyl prevented the fulfilment of glasnost and perestroika, but it also revealed the selfish ambitions of the government through the failures of these policies; this links to the concept of a risk society which was an idea put forward by Ulrich Beck. Dr Beck argues that within modern society 'the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks'.^[11] He describes the concept of a risk society where production for the accumulation of wealth takes priority over the risks that are accompanied by it; these risks are not distributed based on equality, and debates over fairness have little impact.^[12] Glasnost was a promise of better communication with inhabitants and the removal of secrecy from the government-public relationship. Perestroika provided a promise of better economic conditions for the people by moving away from socialist policies. Yet, the government kept silent about the lethal consequences of the construction of a nuclear powerplant and the damages that occurred despite the fatal consequences this would have, and this was done based on the government’s economic motivations as the benefits that the powerplant would provide took priority over the well-being of the people. Gorbachev’s policies were false promises to the public for as long as the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant would continue to function. The danger that the government had put the people in could never be communicated and the selfish ambitions that prioritised the economy over the lives of the people contradicts the belief that glasnost and perestroika would benefit the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. Chernobyl exposed the hidden agendas of the authorities that prove they created a risk society despite their introduction of policies that promised a fairer, safer system of governing the people. The idea of the Soviet Union creating a risk society by using the powerplant reinforces the fact Chernobyl challenged the ideas of glasnost and perestroika enough to see the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the Chernobyl disaster created various issues that would prevent the fulfilment of Mikhail Gorbachev’s newly introduced policies. Through glasnost the Soviet Union promised openness and transparency, a better government-public relationship that would be open to discussing problems within the system, and an end to Soviet silence on crucial matters that the public deserved to be aware of. Introducing this policy during the period of the disaster was a self-destructive decision from the Soviet government who were in fact unwilling to comply with their own newly introduced reforms. It took a short amount of time for the public to witness the contradictory and hypocritical nature of their government, and this led to widespread distrust amongst the Soviet citizens. Chernobyl also challenged the implementation of the new economic reforms under perestroika by creating a damaged economic environment that would struggle to succeed in any attempts of major reformation. The country was economically weak before and after the disaster, but Chernobyl would have contributed to the downfall of the Union because of the destruction it caused to an already failing economic system. Both policies link to the concept of a risk society, as the Soviet Union were exposed of their selfish agendas behind Chernobyl. The selfish priority of the economic well-being of the Union and the silence on the matters of risk to the inhabitants creates an environment that provides a perfect example of a risk society, where the distribution of wealth is of greater importance than the distribution of risk. Therefore, Chernobyl did challenge the fulfilment of the policies of Gorbachev, which prevented the necessary reformation of the governmental system and contributed heavily to the downfall of the Soviet Union.

^[1] Lynn R. Anspaugh, Robert J. Catlin, Marin Goldman, 'The Global Impact of the Chernobyl Reaction Accident' in Science Vol. 242 Iss. 4885 (1988) p.1513
^[2] David S. Mason, 'Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe', in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 64 No. 3 (1988) p.431
^[3] Mark Joseph Stern, 'Did Chernobyl Cause the Soviet Union to Explode?', Slate, https://slate.com/technology/2013/01/chernobyl-and-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union-gorbachevs-glasnost-allowed-the-nuclear-catastrophe-to-undermine-the-ussr.html  (accessed 9/12/2021)
^[4] Ellen Jones, Benjamin L. Woodbury, "Chernobyl' and Glasnost'" in Problems of Communism Vol. 35 Iss. 6 (1986) pp.28-31
^[5] Mikhail Gorbachev, 'First Adress on Chernobyl', Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An online archive of primary sources, http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/meltdown-in-chernobyl/meltdown-in-chernobyl-texts/first-address-on-chernobyl/ (Accessed 9/12/2021)
^[6] Jones, Woodbury, Problems of Communism, p.31
^[7] David S. Mason, 'Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe', (1988) p.431
^[8] Erin Blakemore, 'The Chernobyl disaster: What happened, and the long-term impacts', National Geographic https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/chernobyl-disaster (accessed 9/12/2021)
^[9] Marjolein van der Veen, 'After Fukushima: Revisiting Chernobyl and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', Rethinking Marxism Vol. 25 No. 1 (2013) p.126
^[10] Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Transformation, (London, 1993) pp.3-4
^[11] Dr. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1992) p.19
^[12] Sverker Sörlin, Paul Warde, 'The Problem of the Problem of Environmental History: A Re-Reading of the Field, in Environmental History Vol. 12 Iss. 1 (2007) pp.119-121